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Abstract
Common variation in the prices of European corporate debt may not always
be associated with a rational response to an increase in the relative importance
of a macroeconomic risk factor. Building on Campbell’s ICAPM framework,
we show that risk premia of assets with nonlognormal return distributions rep-
resent compensation not only for exposure to macroeconomic factors but also
for unexpected revisions to these assets’ return distributions, such as sudden
increases in the likelihood of extreme events. If such revisions happen across
assets almost simultaneously, perhaps as a systemic response to a large credit
event, they can induce covariation in risk premia unrelated to the time varia-
tion of the priced macroeconomic factors. Our study presents evidence from the
European debt markets which supports this theory. The asset pricing tests also
document patterns consistent with the “ﬂight to quality” eﬀect for European
corporate bonds.
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11. Introduction
This paper investigates the sources of common time-series variation in the prices of
European corporate debt. Standard asset pricing models state that to the extent
that CDS spreads represent compensation for exposure to systematic risk factors,
common variation in default swap spreads arises mainly because the price of risk of a
systematic factor increases relative to the price of risk of other systematic factors. In
other words, as long as systematic risk factors are the only source of common variation
in credit spreads, equity and credit markets should be well integrated. This, however,
does not seem to be the case at all times. One episode of weak integration between
equity and debt markets dates back to 2002, when the European high-yield market
saw one quarter of its bonds default. On a par basis, nearly 90% of that year’s
defaults came from the telecommunications and cable sectors. Over the ﬁrst quarter
of 2002, European credit spreads computed as the diﬀerence between the redemption
yield on the iBoxx EURO corporate bond index and the 10-year Euro-vs.-Euribor rate
increased by almost 50%, whereas the Morgan Stanley’s MSCI EURO stock market
index remained ﬂat for the same time period. About two years later, during the
three-month period from June until August 2004, European credit spreads rose by
more than 60% while European stocks climbed rather steadily, rising by more than
10%. Although one could argue that certain macroeconomic factors are the source
for the common variation in credit spreads, it is at best doubtful that these would
suddenly become important for the credit market but not for the equity market.
In this study, we propose an alternative explanation for the common variation
in the returns of corporate bonds which is not necessarily related to systematic risk
factors. We argue that for assets with nonlognormal return distributions, such as de-
faultable bonds, common variation in risk premia unrelated to systematic factors can
arise when investors make systemic revisions to the distribution of extreme events
that aﬀect these assets’ payoﬀs. For instance, the dramatic increase in European
credit spreads during the ﬁrst few months of 2002 could have resulted, at least par-
tially, from investors realizing almost simultaneously that the payoﬀ structure of their
credit-contingent claims was more downward skewed than previously anticipated. As
a result, investors in European credit markets may have repriced their credit-sensitive
securities based on a revision of the cash ﬂow distribution rather than on a revision
of the discount rates.
Our argument is rooted in a theoretical result derived in the context of Campbell’s
(1993) intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM). Within this framework,
2we show that the risk premia of defaultable bonds represent compensation not only
for exposure to systematic risk, but also for unexpected revisions to these bonds’ non-
lognormal return distributions. Such unexpected revisions can arise in the aftermath
of an adverse credit-market event, such as a corporate default, when investors have
the opportunity to gather more information about the distribution of extreme events
that may lead to corporate default. For instance, an unexpected corporate default
could present investors with the opportunity to learn that certain extreme events are
more likely than previously anticipated and that the payoﬀ distribution of the de-
faultable bonds they hold is more downward skewed than they previously thought.4
If such revisions in the distribution of default events happen nearly simultaneously
across the entire universe of ﬁrms, the returns of all defaultable bonds will move in
the same direction. More importantly, this common movement in defaultable bond
returns across ﬁrms cannot be attributed to macroeconomic risk.
The advantage of building on Campbell’s ICAPM framework is that it allows us
to identify likely sources of macroeconomic risk that are priced by security markets.
In our context, these sources turn out to be the market factor for Europe and the
long–short spread on European benchmark government bonds. At the same time, it
is important to point out that Campbell’s framework cannot be applied directly to
defaultable bonds. The original framework was developed for securities with lognor-
mal returns and defaultable bonds are quite unlikely to fall into this category. Indeed,
Berndt (2007) provides empirical evidence that instantaneous returns on zero-coupon
defaultable bonds with zero recovery are more likely to follow conditionally lognormal
dynamics as opposed to conditionally normal dynamics.
The theoretical contribution of our paper is the decomposition of the common
variation in the returns of defaultable bonds into a portion that is due to exposure
to macroeconomic risk, proxied by the market and the long–short government term
spread, plus a portion that stems from systemic revisions in the distribution of the
default event across all ﬁrms.
For the remainder of our study, we investigate whether these theoretical impli-
cations have support in European corporate bond markets. Our empirical approach
consists of three steps: First, we identify a latent factor which has the potential of
capturing the comovement in defaultable bond returns that is due to systemic revi-
4The notion of investors revising the payoﬀ distribution for their holdings in corporate debt is
similar in spirit to the credit contagion model by Sch¨ onbucher (2003), who introduces the notion of
frailty models to the credit-risk literature, and by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2003), who model default
contagion via the updating of investors’ beliefs.
3sions of the distributions of the default event across ﬁrms. Second, we test whether
this latent factor induces common variation in bond returns above and beyond the
two macroeconomic risk factors suggested by the theory. Third, we test whether this
latent factor does actually capture the systemic revision of the distributions of the
default event across ﬁrms.
We now describe each of these steps in detail. Regarding the ﬁrst step, to the
extent that investors do revise the distributions of the default events across ﬁrms in
the aftermath of adverse credit-market events, we should see price comovement not
only in defaultable bonds, but also in other credit-contingent securities such as credit
default swaps (CDS), over-the-counter securities that provide default insurance on
debt. Based on this idea, we use CDS data to identify a latent factor which has
the potential to capture the comovement in CDS spreads induced by the systemic
revision of the distributions of the default event across ﬁrms. For this procedure we
only use the CDS spreads of the European non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms with the most liquid
CDS market from January 2003 to October 2006. To extract the latent factor we ﬁrst
use the pricing information in the CDS market quotes to construct excess returns on
zero-coupon zero-recovery defaultable bonds. Then, guided by our model, we extract
our fact as the common component of the residuals of the orthogonal projections
of these excess returns on the market and the long-short term spread on European
benchmark government bonds. We call this latent factor the credit market factor,
or short CMF. Crucial for this step is the extraction of the pricing information from
the available CDS spreads. This is carried out by estimating a time-series model for
risk-neutral default probabilities using credit default swap data.
This step in our empirical approach reveals that CMF captures on average between
30% and 54% of the risk-adjusted excess returns of the zero-coupon zero-recovery
defaultable bonds constructed from the CDS data. This suggests that a potentially
important fraction of the CDS spread captures compensation for unexpected revisions
to the distribution of the default event.
The second step of our empirical analysis, we ﬁrst test whether the CMF has
any impact on corporate bonds. As mentioned, a revision of the default event’s
distribution should impact the pricing of all credit-contingent assets. This implies that
whenever we observe comovements in default swap rates across the CDS market, even
if they cannot be accounted for by changes in macroeconomic risk factors, we should
observe a similar pattern not just in CDS-inferred prices of zero-coupon zero-recovery
bonds, but the corporate bond market as a whole. Given the limited availability of
ﬁrm-level pricing data for European credit and corporate bond markets, this is not
4a tautology, despite the fact that owners of corporate debt use CDS contracts as a
natural hedge against default risk. With 55 European ﬁrms serving as the reference
entities for the CDS data in our sample, the price data for these corporate bond
issuers is bound to be variable and it is unlikely that the hedging eﬀect alone will
account for the comovements in the prices of these two credit-contingent asset classes.
In that sense, it is important to verify that a wide range of European corporate
bond returns responds contemporaneously to the CMF that we extract from CDS
rates for the limited set of liquidly traded reference entities in the European credit
market. In an eﬀort to cover the whole cross section of European corporate bond
returns, we consider a large variety of corporate bond portfolios sorted on one of
three characteristics: credit rating, time-to-maturity and sector. The corporate bond
portfolios used in this study are preconstructed by either Merrill Lynch or Lehman
Brothers and span the entire universe of European corporate bonds.
If investors revise a default event’s distribution, the returns on risky bonds such
as those with low credit ratings or long times to maturity should reﬂect the impact
of these revisions to a larger extent than returns on relatively safe investments in
corporate debt. To illustrate this point, let us consider a simple stylized scenario
where an investor holds two zero-coupon zero-recovery defaultable bonds A and B
with the same time to maturity of one year. Assume that as of today, bond A pays
one unit of account in states s1 and s2 and zero in state s3. Bond B, on the other
hand, pays one unit of account for sure. Suppose that one week from today, investors
realize that state s1 is also a default state in which neither bond will pay anything.
Suppose further that each of these three states is equally likely and that discount
rates remain the same throughout the year. If r denotes the weekly discount rate,
the price of bond A prior to the revision is P A
0 = 2
3e−50r, while the price of bond B is
given by P B
0 = e−50r. After revising the distribution of the default event, these prices
change to P A
1 = 1
3e−49r and P B
1 = 2
3e−49r, respectively. The net holding returns on










3. If there were
no revisions, clearly the net return on both bonds should be r. A revision, however,
is bad news for both bonds, leading to negative net returns. Thus, consistent with
our intuition, the revision induces the net returns of these two bonds to move in the
same direction. More importantly, the riskier bond A records a larger loss, r − rA
1 ,
than bond B since rA
1 < rB
1 .
Our asset pricing test results strongly support the two hypotheses: (i) Corporate
bond portfolios respond contemporaneously to innovations in the CMF. (ii) This
response is commensurate with the riskiness of the portfolio, as measured a priori by
5a set of risk characteristics. Without exception, all corporate bond portfolios load
positively on the CMF, and their loadings increase with the riskiness of the portfolio.
The last step of our empirical analysis answers the question of whether the CMF
does capture the systemic revision of the default event’s distributions across ﬁrms.
To the extent that the returns on equity portfolios are more likely to be lognormally
distributed, we test whether equity portfolios react to innovations in the CMF in any
way. If our story is correct, we should not see any response in the equity portfolios.
Indeed, the data indicate that equity portfolios respond only weakly, and sometimes
even in the wrong direction, to innovations in the CMF. In summary, our results
support the theory that the CMF captures a price behavior that originates from
investors’ systemic revisions of the distribution of the default event, across ﬁrms.
In addition to the aforementioned results, we also document another interesting
pattern in the returns on defaultable debt. Most of the European corporate bond
portfolios load negatively on the excess returns on the market. These loadings become
more negative as the maturity of the assets in the portfolio increases and less negative,
sometimes even positive, as the rating of the assets decreases. In the asset pricing
literature this behavior is referred to as the ﬂight to quality eﬀect. As the economy
goes through a recession period, investors’ appetite for risk decreases and they invest
in safer assets with longer maturities. Similarly, as the economy goes through an
expansion period, investors’ appetite for risk increases and they invest in riskier high-
yield bonds.
This study contributes to the growing literature concerned with the measurement
of the default risk premia that includes Elton et al. (2001), Collin-Dufresne et al.
(2001), Blanco et al. (2004), Longstaﬀ et al. (2004), Driessen (2005), Amato and Re-
molona (2005), Berndt et al. (2005), Saita (2006) and Berndt et al. (2007). With the
exception of Denzler et al. (2005), these studies all focus solely on the U.S. corporate
bond market. In addition to the fact that we study European capital markets, the
contribution of our work to the existing literature stems from extending the ICAPM
to accommodate nonlognormal returns of defaultable securities. We compare the
model’s results to the data, construct a CMF and ﬁnd strong empirical support for
the model’s theoretical implication: the CMF captures the price behavior due to in-
vestors’ systemic revisions to the distribution of default events in the aftermath of
adverse credit-market news.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes in detail
our source for European CDS data and pricing data on European corporate bond and
equity portfolios used in this study. Section 3 describes how to compute CDS-inferred
6prices on zero-coupon zero-recovery defaultable bonds of various maturities and esti-
mates a time-series model of risk-neutral default probabilities using the information
embedded in the CDS spreads. Section 4 presents the theoretical determinants of
default risk premia and constructs an expected-returns beta representation for the
return on defaultable assets. In Section 5, we identify the common variation in the
nonlognormal component of returns on zero-coupon zero-recovery defaultable bonds,
and Section 6 implements a two-step methodology to disentangle the diﬀerent sources
of common variation in excess returns of zero-coupon zero-recovery bonds and con-
structs our CMF. In Section 7, we investigate the nature of the CMF in more detail
and show that it captures compensation for unexpected revisions to the nonlognor-
mal component of the return distribution of credit-sensitive assets. Finally, Section 8
implements a number of robustness checks, summarizes the results of our paper and
concludes.
2. Data
This section discusses our data sources for European CDS rates, systematic factors
and test assets.
2.1. Credit Default Swaps
Credit default swaps are single-name over-the-counter credit derivatives that pro-
vide default insurance. The payoﬀ to the buyer of protection covers losses up to the
notional value in the event of a default by the reference entity. Default events are trig-
gered by bankruptcy, failure to pay, or, for some CDS contracts, a debt-restructuring
event. The buyer of protection pays a quarterly premium, quoted as an annualized
percentage of the notional value, and in return receives the payoﬀ from the seller
of protection should a credit event occur. Fueled by participation from commercial
banks, insurance companies, and hedge funds, the CDS market has been doubling in
size each year for the past decade, reaching $12.43 trillion in notional amount out-
standing by mid-2005.5 In this paper, we use CDS spreads instead of corporate bond
yield spreads as our primitive source for prices of default risk because default-swap
5See, for example, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association mid-2005 market survey.
The CDS market is still undergoing rapid growth. The notional amount of default swaps grew by
almost 48% during the ﬁrst six months of 2005 to $12.43 trillion from $8.42 trillion. This represents
a year-on-year growth rate of 128% from $5.44 trillion at mid-year 2004.
7spreads are less confounded by illiquidity, taxes and various market microstructure
eﬀects that are known to have a marked eﬀect on corporate bond yield spreads.6
In particular, we use default-swap spreads for ﬁve-year CDS contracts for Euro-
denominated senior unsecured debt. The data is provided by Credit Market Anal-
ysis (CMA) Thomson through Datastream. It contains daily CDS bid/ask quotes
contributed by active market participants including banks, hedge funds and active
managers. CMA assures full transparency for its clients by providing a qualiﬁer (Ve-
racity Score) for each data point of any time-series of CDS prices. The Veracity Score
indicates the liquidity or, if applicable, the extent to which a value has been model-
derived. We focus exclusively on ﬁrms with very liquid ﬁve-year CDS markets for
the sample period between January 2003 and November 2006. The CDS contracts
of these ﬁrms typically make up the iTraxx CDS Europe index of 150 most liquid
nonﬁnancial ﬁve-year CDS contracts. To optimally mitigate the tradeoﬀ between the
microstructure eﬀects of high-frequency quotes and the statistical power of our tests,
we focus on weekly CDS quotes. Most of the quotes have a Veracity Score of 3 or
better. This indicates that the quote is associated with an actual trade or that the
quote is an indication provided by a market participant. We do not consider quotes
with a Veracity Score higher than 3.5. The ﬁnal sample of default swap rates used in
this study consists of 55 ﬁrms from 11 European countries and 16 diﬀerent industries,
based on Moody’s industry classiﬁcation. Detailed summary statistics are provided
in Table I. A typical ﬁrm in our sample has 150 valid weekly CDS observations out of
196 maximum possible weekly quotes. The minimum number of weekly observations
is 95. Figure 1 plots the distribution of the credit quality of the ﬁrms in our sample,
showing a concentration of medium credit quality.
The fact that our sample has only 55 ﬁrms is an important caveat of this paper.
The typical major concern with small samples such as ours is whether the sample is
representative enough to support unbiased results. Despite its small size, we believe
our sample is quite diverse because the ﬁrms in our sample are distributed across 16
diﬀerent industries. In addition, since the goal of this paper is to extract information
about the compensation rewarding investors for bearing risk, we believe this informa-
tion can be extracted more precisely7 from the quotes on the CDS contracts of those
ﬁrms with very liquid ﬁve-year CDS markets. To this extent, we are conﬁdent that
6Recent papers that analyze the contribution of noncredit factors to bond yields include Zhou
(2005), Longstaﬀ et al. (2004) and Ericsson and Renault (2001).
7In order to extract this information, we use the approach in Berndt et al. (2005) which requires
a relatively long time series of prices (or quotes, in our case).
8the results in the paper are not biased by the size of our sample.
2.2. Interest Rates, Systematic Factors and Test Assets
Throughout our empirical analysis, we rely on information about the Euro term
structure of riskless bonds. This data is obtained from the Datastream Euro zero
curves constructed relative to Euribor.8 All the excess returns and the zero-cost
portfolios are computed relative to the one-month zero yield.
For the purposes of Sections 6 and 7, we need to compute zero-cost portfolios that
are long the market portfolio and short the one-month zero yield or long the 30-year
zero yield and short the one-month zero yield. For the latter zero-cost portfolio, we
use the data in the Euro zero curves with the corresponding maturities. For the
former zero-cost portfolio, we construct two types of market portfolios: one that
incorporates the entire universe of European stocks and one the incorporates only
the stocks from a speciﬁc country. To maintain consistency with previous studies on
capital markets integration, whenever possible we use portfolios constructed from the
data disseminated in the electronic version of the MSCI. For those countries where
MSCI data is not available, we use the local portfolios constructed by FTSE. All these
portfolios are available through Datastream.9
Finally, for the purposes of Section 7, we need to compute realized returns on a
range of test assets in excess of the one-month zero yield. We consider the following
test assets: the Merrill Lynch nonﬁnancial corporate bond portfolios sorted on rating
and time to maturity (two separate sorts), the Merrill Lynch AAA-, AA-, A- and
BBB-rated corporate bond portfolios sorted on maturity, and the Lehman Brothers
Euro-aggregate industrial corporate bond portfolios sorted on rating, maturity and
sector. The time-series data for all these portfolios comes from Datastream.10
8The mnemonics for the yield of a zero-coupon Euro bond with time to maturity of n years and
m months is EMnYm. For instance the mnemonic corresponding to the maturity of one year and
four months is EM01Y04.
9The mnemonic for the MSCI European market portfolio is MSEURIL. The mnemonics for the
country-speciﬁc market portfolios are WIDNMKE (Denmark), MSFINDL (Finland), MSFRNCL
(France), MSGERML (Germany), MSGDEEL (Greece), MSITALL (Italy), MSNETHL (Nether-
lands), WINWAYE (Norway), MSSPANL (Spain), WISWDNE (Sweden) and FTSE10E (UK).
10These portfolios have respectively the following mnemonics: MLNF3AE, MLNF1AE,
MLNF3BE, MLENFAE, MLENFCE, MLENFDE, MLENFGE, MLEC3AE, MLEC3EE, MLEC3GE,
MLEC3KE, MLEC2CE, MLEC2GE, MLEC2JE, MLEC1CE, MLEC1GE, MLEC1JE, MLEC1KE,
MLEC8CE, MLEC8GE, MLEC8JE, LHAI3AE, LHAI2AE, LHAI1AE, LHAIBAE, LHEHYBA,
LHAC1YE, LHAC3YE, LHAC5YE, LHAC7YE, LHAC10E, LHEAEDE, LHEBANK, LHEB-
MAT, LHECAPG, LHECHEM, LHECOMM, LHACCYE, LHACNCE, LHEDMAN, LHAFBVE,
93. Prices of Defaultable Zero-Coupon Bonds
This section describes how to compute CDS-inferred prices on zero-coupon zero-
recovery defaultable bonds of various maturities. Let us take as given a probability
space (Ω,F,P) and information ﬁltration {Ft : t ≥ 0}. In the absence of arbi-
trage and market frictions, there exists a stochastic discount factor, denoted by M
(see, for instance, Duﬃe, 2001). Moreover, under mild technical conditions, Harrison
and Kreps (1979) and Delbaen and Schachermayer (1999) show that there exists a
“risk-neutral” probability measure Q associated with M. Note that in our setting,
markets are not necessarily complete, so the stochastic discount factor and the asso-
ciated risk-neutral measure may not be unique. This pricing approach nevertheless
allows us to express the price at time t of a security paying Z at time T > t, as






t rs ds Z
i
, where r is the short-term interest rate and E
Q
t de-
notes the expectation operator with respect to Q, conditional on the information
available up to and including time t. In particular, the time-t market value of a de-
faultable zero-coupon bond that pays one unit of account in the event that a currently
surviving ﬁrm does not default before time T and zero otherwise is given by











t rs ds 1{τ>T}
i
, (1)
where τ denotes the default time of the ﬁrm. To compute the prices in Equation (1),
we rely on the reduced-form arbitrage-free approach to pricing defaultable bonds
where the risk-neutral distribution of the default time τ is fully described by a risk-
neutral default intensity process λQ. If we assume the doubly stochastic property
under Q, Equation (1) reduces to












subject to suﬃcient conditions given in Duﬃe (2001).
Motivated by Berndt et al. (2005), we suppose that the risk-neutral default inten-
























t are independent standard Brownian motions with regard to the
physical measure P, and κQ,θQ,i,σQ and ρQ are scalars to be estimated. The risk-
LHALODE, LHAREFE, LHATLPE, LHATBCE, LHAWRSE, and LHAMNCE.
10neutral distribution of λQ is speciﬁed by assuming that
dlogλ
Q,i
















1 − ρQ dB
Q,i
t ,
where ˜ κQ and ˜ θQ,i are scalars to be estimated. Bc
t and Bi
t are independent standard





can compute model-implied values for λQ,i using data on ﬁve-year CDS rates and
an assumed risk-neutral loss given default of LQ = 0.6. For details, we refer the
reader to Section 5.1 in Berndt et al. (2005). To improve the interpretability and
the reliability of our parameter estimates, we impose the overidentifying restriction
that θQ,i equals the sample mean of logλ
Q,i
t and that the ratio of ˜ θQ,i to the sample
mean of log(CDS
i
t/LQ) is constant within a given country. Using country-by-country
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), we obtain estimates for the parameters that
govern the processes for λQ. The estimated values of these parameters are presented
in Table II.
4. An Asset Pricing Model for Assets with Non-
lognormal Returns
In this section we use Campbell’s (1993) discrete ICAPM to identify likely sources
of macroeconomic risk and to understand the impact of these sources of risk on the



















where γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, θ = σ
1−γ
σ−1 and σ is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution.11 As Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) show, the ﬁrst-order





















11For more details on the parameters see Campbell (1993).
11where C is the aggregate consumption, Rm
t+1 is the return on the market portfolio and
Ri
t+1 is the return on a security i.
Campbell (1993) shows that under the assumption that asset returns and con-
sumption growth are jointly conditionally homoscedastic and lognormally distributed,
the aggregate budget constraint can be exploited to substitute out consumption and








Vii + γVim + (γ − 1)Vih, (6)




















. The second argument of the last
covariate captures the news about the future returns on the market. ρ is the steady-
state ratio of invested wealth to total wealth.12
Furthermore, if rb
t+1 denotes the return on a riskless consol bond that pays one









Vii + γVim + (1 − γ)Vib, (7)
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. If we further assume that r
b,⊥
t+1 and the consumption
growth are both jointly conditionally homoscedastic and lognormally distributed, we
can apply the above relation to both rm
t+1 and r
b,⊥
t+1. Using the unconditional versions
of these relations we obtain
￿





































t . Substituting these formulas back into Equation (8) and taking





























where βim = Vim/Vmm and β⊥
ib = V ⊥
ib /V ⊥
bb .13
The expected-returns beta representation in Equation (10) suggests that the time
variation in returns is due mainly to two factors: time variation in the returns on the
market portfolio in excess of the riskless short rate and time variation in the returns of
a portfolio that longs a riskless console bond and shorts the riskless short rate. Close
relatives of this latter portfolio have been previously used in the ﬁnancial economic
literature. One of the best known is the spread between long- and short-term treasury
bonds, or TERM for short. For the exact deﬁnition, see Fama and French (1993).
The representation in Equation (10) applies to any returns that are both jointly ho-
moscedastic and conditionally lognormally distributed with the consumption growth
and the market return. However, returns on certain assets are less likely to satisfy the
latter condition. For instance, Berndt et al. (2005) document that the instantaneous
excess returns on defaultable zero-coupon bonds are more likely to be lognormally
distributed rather than normally distributed (recall that the instantaneous returns
are natural logs of the gross returns). Thus, the above pricing equation might not
work as well for this type of returns. Under certain conditions, the expected-returns
beta representation model in Equation (10) can be slightly generalized to accom-
modate instantaneous excess returns that are not necessarily conditionally normally
distributed. We describe this modiﬁed model below.
Suppose the returns on a defaultable bond rD
t can be decomposed into two compo-
nents. The ﬁrst component, r
D,c
t , is jointly homoscedastic and lognormally distributed
with the consumption growth and the market return. The second component, r
D,n
t ,
is orthogonal on the information contained on both the consumption growth and the
market.14 This latter component is going to capture the impact of the departure
13Notice that βim and βib are in fact the conditional betas, which happen to be constant under
the homoscedasticity assumption. Thus, they can be diﬀerent from the unconditional betas.
14Here is one way to implement such a decomposition. Let µ = ErD
t and kr =
cov(rt+1,rt)/cov(rt,rt). Deﬁne νt+1 =
￿
rD




t+1 denote the linear pro-
jection of νt+1 onto the space generated by the consumption growth and the market return. Let
ν⊥
t+1 = νt+1 − νc
t+1 denote the orthogonal residual. Since both the consumption growth and the
market return are conditionally normally distributed, νc
t+1 will be also conditionally normally dis-
tributed. In addition, since νt+1 has zero mean, both νc
t+1 and ν⊥
t+1 can be normalized to have zero
mean. Deﬁne r
D,c
t recursively as follows: r
D,c
t+1 − µ = kr(r
D,c





13from the conditional lognormality assumption on prices. Under these assumptions it


































































bb , and zt = −logEter
D,n
t+1. Making use of the fact that rD,n is
orthogonal on the information contained in the market returns and the long–short



































t+1. The returns model associated with this represen-
tation can be summarized as
r
D,e












t is an iid normally distributed error term with mean zero.
Thus, as do conditionally lognormal returns, the returns of defaultable bonds
vary over time in response to changes in excess market returns and the returns on the
long–short treasury portfolio. However, unlike conditionally lognormal returns, the
returns of defaultable bonds are also moved by changes in the shape of the conditional
distribution of rD, via ∆zt. This latter source of time variation could host both a
common component as well as an undiversiﬁable ﬁrm-speciﬁc component. More im-
portantly, these two components aﬀect the level of expected returns directly rather
than through covariances. This follows from the fact that r
D,n
t is orthogonal on the
stochastic discount factor M. An important consequence of this result is the fact
that to the extent that ∆zt hosts a common component, this component cannot be
related to macroeconomic risk (i.e., the stochastic discount factor M). Of course,
this argument is viable as long as our model of returns is suﬃciently well speciﬁed.
deﬁne r
D,n

















t satisfy the desired properties.
15Campbell (1993) shows that the informational content of this portfolio overlaps with that of the
market returns and the consumption growth.
14Admittedly Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) show that a close version of the model
in Equation (10)—the “bad beta, good beta” model—does a very good job in captur-
ing important time-series properties of U.S. stock returns—including size and value
“anomalies”—and, as such, could be a well-speciﬁed model for them. However, there
is still the possibility that the same model is not well speciﬁed for European stock
returns.16 If our model is misspeciﬁed, then the common component in ∆zt could be
correlated with an omitted macroeconomic factor. We take up this empirical matter
in a subsequent section. Before we do so, however, we ﬁrst need to identify the com-
mon component in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc time-varying terms ∆zt. The next section deals
precisely with this issue.
5. Identifying the Common Variation in the Non-
lognormal Component of Returns
Our methodology for identifying the common component of the terms ∆zi
t, where i
is an index for ﬁrms, is reminiscent of the ﬁxed time eﬀects in panel regressions. It
consists of two steps: In the ﬁrst step, we identify the residuals from the ﬁrm-speciﬁc















t are iid normally distributed errors with zero means. In the second step, for







i + ˆ ￿
i
s. (15)
The time series ˆ fs captures the common variation of the residuals ˆ ￿i
s. The extent
to which ˆ fs captures only the common variation in these residuals depends on the
number of bonds in the sample as well as the degree of correlation across residuals.
For instance, if ￿i
s = ρiZs + ξi
s, where Zs and ξi
s are iid normal variables and if N is
16Several studies have addressed the issue of market integration between the U.S. and European
stock markets. Some of the best known studies include: Karolyi and Stulz (2003), Bekaert and
Harvey (1995), Bekaert et al. (2005), Harvey (1995), Ferson and Harvey (1993), Griﬃn (2002) and
others.








and therefore it captures only the common variation in the residuals.
While there are other ways to construct measures of common variation for our
residuals—we construct and test a few alternatives in a later section—we choose this
particular methodology for its simplicity and ease of interpretation. Intuitively, fs
picks up the ﬁxed time eﬀects of the residuals, which are the output of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
regressions of bond excess returns on the market and term-spread excess returns. We
will refer to fs as the CMF.
To implement this methodology, we need to compute the bond returns on the left-
hand side of Equation (14). In fact, the pricing restriction in Equation (10), while
exempliﬁed so far with bond returns, holds true for any kind of returns, as long as
long as they are holding returns.
Given the superior liquidity of the CDS market over the corporate bond market,
for instance, our intent is to use the quote data on CDS spreads to compute the left-
hand side returns. Holding returns on CDS contracts are neither readily available nor
easy to compute given that we only have data on the CDS premium (spread) set forth
at the outset of the contract. One way to circumvent this problem is to use the pricing
information of the CDS spread quotes to construct holding returns on zero-coupon
bonds of various maturities and then use these holding returns in excess of the risk-
free rate as our primary dependent variable in the ﬁrst step of our methodology. The
drawback of this approach is that returns computed in this manner will reﬂect not
only the informational content of the CDS spread quotes, but also the assumptions
used in order to extract this information. This critique applies, however, whenever
returns are inferred rather than readily available. For robustness, we also consider an
alternative approach which approximates holding returns with the diﬀerence between
two consecutive quotes.17 The results under this speciﬁcation are presented in a later
section.
The next step is to compute returns on defaultable zero-coupon bonds. Relying
on the notation from Section 3, the holding return between time t and time t+ 1 for
17Since the quotes at time t and t−1 are essentially quotes on diﬀerent issues (same type of CDS
contract on the same entity but originated at diﬀerent times), this measure of holding return will be
a very coarse approximation of actual holding returns. Hence results under this speciﬁcation should
be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
16a defaultable zero-coupon zero-recovery bond with maturity T > t + 1 is given by
rt+1 = logP(t + 1,T − t − 1) − logP(t,T − t), (17)
where P(t,T −t) denotes the time-t market value of the bond. As a special case, the
holding return for the period [T − 1,T] is computed as
rT = −logP(T − 1,T). (18)
It is important to notice that these returns cannot be computed directly because we
do not have data on defaultable zero-coupon corporate bonds. They will be inferred
from CDS rates as explained in Section 3.
We start with the formula in Equation (2). Suppose the risk-neutral default
intensity λ
Q
t = λQ,c+λQ,n such that λQ,c and rs are correlated Gaussian processes (in
particular, they are joint homoscedastic and conditionally normally distributed) and
λQ,n is orthogonal on the information contained in the consumption growth rates and
the market returns.18 Then,



















































Since rt and λ
Q,c














= A(T − t) − B(T − t)r
f
t − C(T − t)λ
Q,c
t , (20)
where A(T −t), B(T −t) and C(T −t) depend on T −t only.19 Thus, logP(t,T −t)
can be rewritten as
logP(t,T − t) = A(T − t) − B(T − t)r
f


















































18See Footnote 14 for a way to construct such a decomposition
19See the appendix for the derivation of these coeﬃcients.
17the nonlognormal component of the returns. For a ﬁrm i, the expected-returns beta


















































































































ii is the variance of the nonlognormal return component ri,n. The return model
in Equation (13) becomes
Bi(T − t)r
f
t − Bi(T − t − 1)r
f
t+1 + Ci(T − t)λ
i,Q













and thus the excess returns to be used in the ﬁrst step of our methodology, Equa-
tion (14), can now be computed as a function of the default intensities:
r
i,e
t+1 = Bi(T − t)r
f
t − Bi(T − t − 1)r
f
t+1 + Ci(T − t)λ
i,Q





Given the estimated time series for the risk-neutral default intensities from Sec-
tion 3, we can now compute returns of defaultable zero-coupon bonds. In what follows,
we will formally test the expected-returns beta representation derived in Section 4.
6. Time Variation in Defaultable Debt Returns
This section deals with the implementation of the two-step methodology for ident-
ifying the sources of common variation in zero-coupon zero-recovery bond excess
returns of various maturities.
In order to implement the ﬁrst step, we need to proxy for the two zero-cost port-
folios capturing the systematic risk, namely the market portfolio and the portfolio
that longs a riskless console bond paying one unit of account every period and shorts
the short interest rate. For this exercise, we set the holding period to a week.
18The reference entities behind the CDS contracts in our data set are from various
European countries. Most of these countries are also part of the European Monetary
Union20 but there are few countries that are not (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and
the UK). Since capital markets throughout Europe are more or less integrated,21
we proxy for the market portfolio with both a portfolio tracking the largest stocks
throughout Europe as well as local portfolios tracking the largest, most liquid stocks
within a speciﬁc country. To maintain consistency with the previous studies on capital
markets integration, whenever possible we use portfolios constructed from the data
disseminated in the electronic version of the MSCI. For those countries where MSCI
data is not available, we use the local portfolios constructed by FTSE. For more
information on these portfolios, see Section 2.2. Since the CDS spreads in our data
set are reported relative to the Euro term structure, it is important that the returns on
these portfolios are extracted from prices reported in Euros. We denote with r
EMKT,e
t
the weekly returns on the European market portfolio in excess of the riskless short
rate and with r
CMKT,e
t the weekly returns on the local market portfolio in excess of the
riskless short rate. The riskless short rate corresponds to the yield of the one-month
zero-coupon Euro bond. For more information on the Euro term structure curves,
see Section 2.2.
We proxy for the other source of systematic risk—captured by the portfolio which
longs a riskless console bond paying one unit of account every week and shorts the
short interest rate—with the term-spread portfolio, which longs the 30-year zero-
coupon riskless Euro bond and shorts the one-month Euro bond. We denote the
weekly returns of this portfolio with rTERM
t .
The ﬁrst step in extracting the common variation in the returns inferred from the



















The excess returns on the left-hand side are excess returns on zero-coupon zero-
recovery corporate bonds and they depend on the risk-neutral default intensity and
maturity. The default intensities are extracted from the CDS data as indicated in the
previous section. Since these excess returns are inferred from CDS spreads data, we
20See Table I for more details
21There is quite a bit of literature on this topic. Some of the most well known studies include
Fama and French (1998), Griﬃn (2002), Ferson and Harvey (1993), Bekaert and Harvey (1995), and
Karolyi and Stulz (2003).
19have no a priori preference for a speciﬁc maturity. To limit the potential impact of
the choice of maturity on our results, we perform the same empirical exercise for six
maturities: one week, one year, two years, three years, four years and ﬁve years. In
addition, as mentioned in Section 4, the excess returns on the left-hand side are not
lognormally distributed, in general, and thus the residuals will not be lognormally
distributed either. This observation is important because the typical t-statistic might
not be very informative in the context of these regressions.
Table III presents the averages of the estimated coeﬃcients of these regressions
along with their average standard errors. We present the results across the six matu-
rities to assess the impact of the choice of maturity.
For all choices of maturity, the results show that the common risk factors consid-
ered explain relatively little from the time variation of the LHS excess returns—in all
instances the adjusted R2 is around 15%. Also notable is the size of the pricing errors
and their standard errors. Except for the one-week maturity, the absolute value of
the pricing error increases with the maturity as well, and it ranges from 6 bps to
about 21 bps. These errors are consistently diﬀerent from 0, with t-statistics of at
least 4. These are relatively sizable pricing errors (for weekly returns), suggesting
that the return model based only on the market and the TERM factors could be
misspeciﬁed. This is not surprising given that the independent variables are close to
being lognormally distributed while the dependent variable is not. More importantly,
from the perspective of the model derived in Section 4, these results are reassuring.
We now proceed with implementing the second step of our methodology as de-
scribed in Section 5. Using the residuals extracted from the ﬁrst step and Equa-
tion (15), we construct estimates for the CMF at every point in time.
The next to last column of Table III reports the average of the fraction of the
pricing error explained by the CMF. We notice that the CMF captures as much as
53.84%, on average, of the time variation of the pricing errors of the risk-adjusted
excess returns of zero-coupon zero-recovery bonds with a maturity of ﬁve years. This
fraction decreases to 29.83% as we decrease the maturity of the bonds to one year.
In the special case, when the maturity is one week, the CMF captures 35.28% of the
pricing error. The last column of Table III also reports the increase in the R2 of the
regression of the CDS-inferred excess bond returns on the two macroeconomic factor
and the CMF. We notice that by accounting for the CMF, the R2 of the regression
increases by at least 4 times.
While the change in the average magnitude from one week to one year might
seem a bit puzzling, we should keep in mind that the returns of the zero-coupon
20zero-recovery bonds with time to maturity of one week are special because the payoﬀ
of these bonds is 1. This is unique to the time to maturity of one week, because the
holding period throughout this study is ﬁxed at one week as well.
According to the model developed in Section 4, the CMF captures the common
variation of the nonlognormal component of CDS-inferred returns. The same model
tells us that this factor impacts expected returns level directly rather than through
covariances. If our model is correct, this result suggests that the CMF picks up
common variation in the nonlognormal component of CDS-inferred returns that does
not originate from exposure to the common risk factors endogenous to the model.
Such a scenario is not completely implausible and here is why.
The spreads of a new CDS contract or the value of a corporate bond at some point
in time depend on the investors’ assessment of the distribution of the default event
at that time. This dependency is particularly strong for zero-coupon zero-recovery
bonds given that the uncertainty in the payoﬀ structure of these assets reduces only
to the uncertainty about the occurrence of the default event. In this context, the
occurrence of a new credit event gives investors an opportunity to learn more about
(update) the distribution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc extreme events leading to default. In partic-
ular, if the observed credit event reveals that certain extreme events are more likely
than previously thought, investors would react rationally by updating the distribution
of the default event across the entire universe of credit-contingent assets—including
corporate bonds and CDS contracts. This systemic reaction could lead to common-
ality in the price (or return) behavior of these assets inducing common variation. It
is important to notice that such commonality in price behavior might not be related
to changes in the underlying macroeconomic risk factors. That is because the update
on the investor side is essentially a revision of the distribution of payoﬀs and this
revision might not lead to changes in discount rates.
To illustrate this argument, consider the period surrounding the U.S. corporate
scandals in 2001–2002. The default of Enron and Worldcom in 2001 uncovered that
certain “value-enhancing” accounting practices were more commonly employed across
ﬁrms then previously thought. The downward correction in ﬁrm value demanded
by rational investors in the aftermath of these credit events led mechanically to an
upward correction in the likelihood of the default event (because ﬁrms were now closer
to their default boundary). These revisions led to a drop in the corporate bond prices
and, at the same time, induced bondholders to scramble for insurance—driving the
CDS spreads up.
Thus, one can argue that the CMF is capturing the systemic revision of the default
21event’s distribution across ﬁrms, following the occurrence of a seemingly unrelated
corporate default. The next section investigates whether this theory is supported by
the data.
7. Supporting Evidence
The CMF is extracted from the CDS data of the ﬁrms with the most liquid CDS
market during our sample period. As documented in the previous section, this factor
is able to capture a large fraction of the time variation in the returns of zero-coupon
zero-recovery corporate bonds of the ﬁrms in our sample. The asset pricing model
developed in Section 4 suggests that the common variation in these returns reﬂects
exposure to macroeconomic risk factors only to the extent that this common variation
originates from exposure to two sources of systematic risk: the market and the term
spread. By construction, the CMF captures common variation beyond whatever can
be explained by these sources of macroeconomic risk. One possible explanation sug-
gested by our model is that the CMF captures the systemic response of the investors
who act upon observed corporate defaults by revising their assessment of the default
event’s distribution. In this section, we investigate whether this theory has support
in the data.
The revision of the distribution of the default event should impact the pricing of
all credit-contingent assets. This means that, to the extent that we observe comove-
ment in spreads across the CDS market, we should observe a similar phenomenon in
the corporate bond market as well. This is not necessarily a tautology, despite the
fact that CDS contracts are a natural hedge for corporate bonds. When the reference
entities behind corporate bonds and CDS contracts are diﬀerent ﬁrms with diﬀerent
characteristics, the hedging eﬀect is not likely to be the source of the comovement in
the prices of these two classes of credit-contingent assets. To ensure that the reference
entities behind the corporate bonds used in our tests are diﬀerent enough from the
ﬁrms in our CDS sample, we consider a variety of corporate bond portfolios sorted on
three diﬀerent characteristics: rating, time to maturity and sector. These portfolios
are preconstructed by either Merrill Lynch or Lehman Brothers and they focus on ei-
ther the entire universe of European corporate bonds or on the nonﬁnancial/industrial
sectors.22.
Riskier bonds—such as those with lower ratings or longer time to maturity—are
22For more information on these portfolios see Section 2.2.
22more likely to display skewness and fat tails in their return distributions. Our theory
implies that if investors revise the default event’s distribution in the aftermath of a
corporate default, the returns of the riskier bonds should reﬂect the impact of these
revisions to a larger extent.
To illustrate this point consider the following stylized example. Suppose an in-
vestor holds two zero-coupon bonds with the same maturity of one year. As of right
now, Bond A pays 1 in states s1 and s2 and 0 in state s3. Bond B pays 1 for sure.
Suppose that one week later the investor realizes that s1 could lead to default and
so both bonds will now pay 0 in that state. Suppose further that each of these three
states is equally likely and that discount rates remain the same throughout the year.
Let r denote the weekly discount rate. Prior to the revision, the price of bond A is
P A
0 = 2
3e−50r, while the price of bond B is P B
0 = e−50r. After the revision, these prices
change to P A
1 =
1
3e−49r and P B
1 =
2
3e−49r, respectively. The net holding returns on





0 = rlog 1
2 and rB
1 = rlog 2
3, respectively.
If there were no revision, the net return on both bonds should be r. However, the
revision is bad news for both bonds and their prices drop, leading to negative net
returns. Thus, consistent with our theory, the revision induces the net returns of
these two bonds to move in the same direction. More importantly, the riskier bond,
bond A, records a larger loss: r − rA
1 > r − rB
1
We now present evidence supporting the dual hypothesis that systemic revisions
to a default event’s distribution—as captured by the CMF—lead to comovement in
corporate bond returns and that these revisions have more impact on the riskier
bonds.














CMFCMF t+1 + ￿
i
t+1, (28)
where ri,e is the excess return on the portfolio i used as the test asset.
Tables IV–X report the estimated coeﬃcients for the corporate bond portfolios
we use as test assets. The CMF used in these tests is extracted from defaultable
zero-coupon bonds maturing in ﬁve years. The results for the other ﬁve choices of
time to maturity are illustrated in Figures 2–5.
The results reported in these tables overwhelmingly support our dual hypothesis.
All portfolios load positively on the CMF and these loadings trend in the direction
suggested by the characteristic used in constructing these portfolios. For instance,
the Merrill Lynch portfolios sorted on credit quality (rating) load heavier on the CMF
23when the rating is lower. Similarly, the Merrill Lynch portfolios within a rating class,
sorted further on maturity, load heavier on the CMF when the time to maturity
is larger. The same pattern can be observed for the Merrill Lynch portfolios of
nonﬁnancials sorted on maturity. These patterns are further supported by all the
Lehman Brothers portfolios sorted on either rating or time to maturity. Noticeable
here is the loading of the high-yield portfolio which is almost 3 times higher than
the loading of the BAA-rated corporate bonds and more than 80 times higher than
the loading of the AAA-rated corporate bonds. These results transgress the choice
for time to maturity when constructing the CMF. Figures 2–6 show that most of the
patterns continue to hold when the time to maturity varies from one week to ﬁve
years.
To increase the power of our test, we can run the previous time-series regressions
as pooled time-series regressions. Speciﬁcally, for each group of portfolios—Lehman
Brothers sorted on rating, maturity or sector and Merrill Lynch sorted on rating,
maturity or both—we run the following pooled regression.
r
i,e




t+1 + βCMFCMF t+1 + ￿
i
t+1, (29)
where i is an index for corporate bond portfolios in a given group.
Table XI presents the results. In all instances the loading on the CMF is always
positive and signiﬁcant at a 5% level (after correcting for lags using the Newey–West
procedure). Once again, this provides support for the importance of the CMF in
explaining the time-variation of corporate bond returns.
While we expect the CMF to have an impact on corporate bond portfolios—the
returns of these portfolios are more likely to be nonlognormally distributed—we also
expect that the CMF will have no impact on equity portfolios—the returns of these
portfolios are more likely to be lognormally distributed. To test if this is the case, we
run pooled time-series regressions similar to the ones in Equation (29) for country-
speciﬁc equity portfolios sorted on sector. These portfolios are based on the price-level
sector indexes for each country, available from Datastream. The results are presented
in Table XII. For all countries considered, our results support the hypothesis that the
CMF has no impact on the returns of the equity portfolios. This result reassures us
once again that the CMF is likely to capture a price behavior speciﬁc to assets with
nonlognormal returns only.
Tables IV–X also reveal another interesting pattern. Most of the corporate bond
portfolios load negatively on the market. These loadings become more negative as the
24maturity of the assets in the portfolios increases and less negative (and even positive)
as the rating of the assets deteriorates. This fact seems to conﬁrm the ﬂight to
quality eﬀect. As the economy goes through an expansion, investors’ appetite for risk
increases and they are more likely to invest in riskier assets such as high yield (lower
rating) corporate bonds. As the economy goes through a recession, investors’ appetite
for risk turns sour and they prefer to invest in safer assets with longer maturity—such
as high-rating long-term corporate bonds.
8. Discussion and Conclusion
To ensure the robustness of our ﬁndings, we investigate two alternative ways of ex-
tracting the CMF. We then investigate whether the results of the previous section
remain valid.
The ﬁrst alternative computes the returns of the zero-coupon zero-recovery de-
faultable bonds used on the left-hand side of the regression in Equation (14) simply
as the diﬀerence between two consecutive ﬁve-year CDS market rates. This approach
has the advantage of being nonparametric (and model free). However, it only provides
a very coarse approximation of the actual returns.
The second alternative proposes a diﬀerent way to extract the CMF. Essentially,
the extracted value for the CMF at time t equals the loading on the time dummy at
















where δt = 1 if the time stamp is t, and 0 otherwise. In both cases, our unreported
results support qualitatively and, sometimes, quantitatively the results reported in
the previous section.
In summary, the CDS market is one of the largest and most liquid markets and
comparable in many respects with the equity market. Yet, there are times when these
two markets seem to move very diﬀerently on an aggregate level. The question is,
Why? If common variation in these markets arises exclusively as a consequence of
exposure to the same macroeconomic risk, these markets should move in sync. Yet
that does not seem to happen all the time. In this paper, we try to understand the
sources of common time-series variation in the premiums of the CDS contracts.
We use a slightly modiﬁed version of the Campbell’s ICAPM to characterize the
risk premia of the assets with and without lognormal returns. According to the model,
25the common variation in the returns of assets with lognormal returns can only arise
from exposure to two macroeconomic risk factors: the market and the term spread—
the spread between the long and the short ends of the term structure of interest rates.
However, common variation in the returns of the assets with nonlognormal returns
can also arise if investors systemically revise the distribution of the default event in
the aftermath of a corporate default.
Using European CDS, corporate bond and equity data, we provide evidence in
support of this theory. To the extent that investors learn from corporate defaults and
update the distribution of the default event, the impact of these revisions should be
particularly high for defaultable zero-coupon zero-recovery corporate bonds. Returns
on these type of bonds are not readily available, but they can be inferred from CDS
data, which is typically available. We construct such returns and identify a common
component in these returns that captures the systemic updating on the part of the
investors, as suggested by the theory. We call this component the CMF.
Our tests concentrate around corporate bond and equity portfolios. To overcome
the potential hedging bias, we consider a large variety of bond portfolios sorted on
rating, time to maturity and sector. We ﬁnd that corporate bond portfolios respond to
innovations in the two macroeconomic risk factors, but they also respond positively to
innovations in the CMF. All our equity portfolios—presorted on sector and country—
show little or no response to innovations in the CMF. This is consistent with our
theory since equity returns are more likely to be lognormally distributed and should
only respond to innovations in the macroeconomic risk factors.
The model and the evidence provided in this paper seem to suggest that the
sources of common variation for a particular market do not necessarily have to be
associated with macroeconomic risk factors. This point has been made previously by
Daniel and Titman (1997) for equity markets. We expand the focus of this point to
the credit and corporate bond markets.
A. Derivation of the Coeﬃcients for Equation (20)
The coeﬃcients A(T −t), B(T −t) and C(T −t) can be derived in a recursive fashion





follow jointly Gaussian dynamics of the following form.
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f
t+1 = kr¯ r







t+1 = kλ¯ λ







26Then, for any t < T, we have
A(T − t) = A(T − t − 1) − [B(T − t − 1) + 1]kr¯ r
















B(T − t) = [B(T − t − 1) + 1](1 − kr)
C(T − t) = [C(T − t − 1) + 1](1 − kλ),
with the initial conditions A(0) = B(0) = C(0) = 0. Notice that under the decom-
position suggested in Footnote (14), kλ can be computed as follows:
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30Tables
Table I: Distribution of ﬁrms across industries and countries
Industry Name No. of Firms Country No. of Firms
Advertising 1 Denmark 1
Aerospace/Defense 2 Finland 5
Airlines 4 France 13
Automotives 6 Germany 10
Chemicals 5 Greece 1
Entertainment 1 Italy 2
Food/Soft Drinks 2 Netherlands 4
Hotels 1 Norway 1
Machinery 1 Spain 2
Media 2 Sweden 5
Paper 3 UK 11
Printing/Publishing 3





Firms are grouped into industries according to the Moody’s industry classiﬁcation.
31Table II: Estimation of the risk-neutral default intensities
κQ σQ ρQ mean(θQ) ˜ κQ mean(˜ κQ ˜ θQ) no ﬁrms
Denmark 0.154 0.444 – 3.624 −0.123 −0.220 1
Finland 0.290 0.410 0.309 3.870 0.003 0.242 5
France 1.363 1.455 0.683 2.959 0.158 0.402 13
Germany 1.764 1.274 0.591 2.962 0.224 0.722 10
Greece 4.533 1.043 – 3.182 0.186 0.768 1
Italy 1.086 1.872 0.767 3.257 0.306 0.611 2
Netherlands 3.339 0.938 0.902 2.848 −0.206 −0.854 4
Norway 2.640 0.257 – 2.758 −0.159 −0.214 1
Spain 2.512 0.510 0.287 3.070 0.015 0.325 2
Sweden 0.673 1.098 0.220 3.246 0.289 1.401 5
UK 1.143 0.849 0.357 3.530 0.182 0.903 11
Summary statistics for the country-by-country parameter estimates describing the
dynamics of the risk-neutral default intensities in Equation (4).
32Table III: Estimates for the return model in Equation (27)
α βEMKT βCMKT βTERM Perc(C) Perc(S)
0.0000 −0.0005 0.0001 0.1607 35.28 404.04
(3.3160) (−0.0101) (0.0077) (2.6410)
−0.0006 0.0045 0.0028 1.1120 29.83 405.40
(−4.3896) (0.7568) (0.1908) (3.7908)
−0.0010 0.0064 0.0031 1.9146 39.16 460.73
(−4.8849) (0.6559) (0.1730) (4.1127)
−0.0014 0.0073 0.0030 2.6169 45.85 497.29
(−5.1307) (0.5875) (0.1595) (4.2915)
−0.0018 0.0080 0.0027 3.2480 50.50 521.64
(−5.2826) (0.5376) (0.1498) (4.4050)
−0.0021 0.0086 0.0024 3.8203 53.84 538.83
(−5.3858) (0.4992) (0.1426) (4.4827)
This table reports the results of the panel regression of the excess returns of de-
faultable zero-coupon bonds on the excess market returns (EMKT), the excess local
market return (CMKT), the spread between long and short Euro bonds (TERM)
and the dummies controlling for speciﬁc weeks between January 2003 and October
2006, 197 weeks. The left-hand side excess returns correspond to defaultable bonds
with the following times to expiration: one week, one year, two years, three years,
four years and ﬁve years. The ﬁrst line in the table corresponds to the estimates of
the returns model where the left-hand side returns correspond to corporate bonds
with the shortest time to maturity. The CMF at time t corresponds to the slope
coeﬃcient of the dummy controlling for time t. The Perc(C) column reports the
fraction of the pricing error, obtained from the ﬁrst step, explained by the CMF.
The Perc(S) column reports the increase in adjusted R2 when the CMF is added to
the independent variables in the regression of step 1. The t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. The reported values for the estimates are averages across ﬁrms of the
corresponding ﬁrm-speciﬁc estimates.
33Table IV: The Merrill Lynch nonﬁnancial corporate bond portfolios sorted on rating
α βEMKT βTERM βCMF adj R2 E [R]
0.0005 −0.0595 0.3449 0.2627 0.1995 0.0006
(0.5557) (−4.3825) (0.1998) (0.9530)
0.0003 −0.0449 1.3751 0.3485 0.0999 0.0007
(0.2899) (−3.2363) (0.6576) (1.1975)
0.0003 −0.0182 2.0377 0.4504 0.0458 0.0009
(0.2616) (−1.1118) (1.0694) (1.6468)
This table reports the results of the time-series regressions of the excess realized
returns of three Merrill Lynch nonﬁnancial corporate bond portfolios sorted on rating
(AAA, A and BBB), on the excess market returns (EMKT), the spread between long
and short Euro bonds (TERM) and the CMF between January 2003 and October
2006, 197 weeks. The CMF is extracted from returns on defaultable zero-coupon
bonds maturing in ﬁve years according to the model in Equation (27). The ﬁrst line
corresponds to the higher-rating portfolio. The Newey–West t-statistics (adjusting
for 3 lags) are reported in parentheses.
34Table V: AAA and AA Merrill Lynch corporate bond portfolios sorted on maturity
α βEMKT βTERM βCMF adj R2 E [R]
AAA Portfolios Sorted on Maturity
0.0001 −0.0228 0.6924 0.1827 0.1864 0.0005
(0.1321) (−4.9212) (0.9058) (1.7263)
0.0003 −0.0561 0.8716 0.3009 0.1882 0.0005
(0.3379) (−4.6869) (0.4915) (1.1967)
0.0007 −0.0759 0.6578 0.3428 0.1754 0.0007
(0.4863) (−4.3608) (0.2709) (0.9914)
0.0012 −0.1068 −0.1108 0.2672 0.1413 0.0010
(0.5301) (−4.0024) (−0.0278) (0.4943)
AA Portfolios Sorted on Maturity
0.0002 −0.0405 0.9782 0.2699 0.1756 0.0005
(0.2564) (−4.6479) (0.7125) (1.4026)
0.0006 −0.0735 0.9079 0.3674 0.1689 0.0007
(0.4663) (−4.2552) (0.3741) (1.0345)
0.0011 −0.0852 0.4482 0.3962 0.1472 0.0009
(0.6194) (−4.0652) (0.1486) (0.9308)
This table reports the results of the time-series regressions of the excess realized
returns of four AAA-rated Merrill Lynch corporate bond portfolios sorted on maturity
(1–3 years, 3–5 years, 5–7 years and 10+ years) and three AA-rated Merrill Lynch
corporate bond portfolios sorted on maturity (1–5 years, 5–7 years, and 7–10 years)
on the excess market returns (EMKT), the spread between long and short Euro bonds
(TERM) and the CMF between January 2003 and October 2006, 197 weeks. The
CMF is extracted from returns on defaultable zero-coupon bonds maturing in ﬁve
years according to the model in Equation (27). The ﬁrst line in each of the two
panels corresponds to the lower-maturity portfolio. The t–statistics are reported in
parentheses.
35Table VI: A and BBB Merrill Lynch corporate bond portfolios sorted on maturity
α βEMKT βTERM βCMF R2 E [R]
A Portfolios Sorted on Maturity
0.0002 −0.0333 1.1517 0.2764 0.1416 0.0006
(0.2502) (−3.9213) (0.8837) (1.4436)
0.0007 −0.0638 1.1890 0.4313 0.1398 0.0008
(0.5141) (−3.7003) (0.5009) (1.1918)
0.0010 −0.0683 1.0885 0.4733 0.1068 0.0010
(0.5703) (−3.1622) (0.3642) (1.1045)
0.0015 −0.0607 1.6356 0.7687 0.0577 0.0012
(0.6192) (−2.2942) (0.4022) (1.3974)
BBB Portfolios Sorted on Maturity
0.0001 −0.0107 1.7770 0.3616 0.0546 0.0008
(0.1794) (−1.1048) (1.4401) (1.9255)
0.0004 −0.0341 2.4134 0.5214 0.0568 0.0009
(0.2502) (−1.5129) (1.0277) (1.3538)
0.0008 −0.0236 2.5044 0.6602 0.0359 0.0012
(0.4681) (−0.9869) (0.8136) (1.5680)
This table reports the results of the time-series regressions of the excess realized
returns of four A-rated Merrill Lynch corporate bond portfolios sorted on maturity
(1–5 years, 5–7 years, 7–10 years and 10+ years) and three BBB-rated Merrill Lynch
corporate bond portfolios sorted on maturity (1–5 years, 5–7 years, and 7–10 years),
on the excess market returns (EMKT), the spread between long and short Euro
bonds (TERM) and the CMF between January 2003 and October 2006, 197 weeks.
The CMF is extracted from returns on defaultable zero-coupon bonds maturing in
ﬁve years according to the model in Equation (27). The ﬁrst line in each of the
two panels corresponds to the lower-maturity portfolio. The Newey–West t-statistics
(adjusted for 3 lags) are reported in parentheses.
36Table VII: The Merrill Lynch nonﬁnancial corporate bond portfolios sorted on matu-
rity
α βEMKT βTERM βCMF adj R2 E [R]
0.0000 −0.0145 1.2130 0.2207 0.0909 0.0006
(0.01947) (−2.1089) (1.5237) (1.8600)
0.0002 −0.0328 1.8151 0.3889 0.0994 0.0007
(0.1957) (−2.8268) (1.0831) (1.6571)
0.0004 −0.0493 1.7211 0.4422 0.0927 0.0008
(0.3192) (−2.5540) (0.7296) (1.2075)
0.0014 −0.0597 2.1434 0.7049 0.0474 0.0015
(0.5520) (−1.6539) (0.5077) (1.2781)
This table reports the results of the time-series regressions of the excess realized
returns of four Merrill Lynch nonﬁnancial corporate bond portfolios sorted on ma-
turity (1–3 years, 3–5 years, 5–7 years and 10+ years) on the excess market returns
(EMKT), the spread between long and short Euro bonds (TERM) and the CMF
between January 2003 and October 2006, 197 weeks. The CMF is extracted from
returns on defaultable zero-coupon bonds maturing in ﬁve years according to the
model in Equation (27). The ﬁrst line corresponds to the lower-maturity portfolio.
The Newey–West t-statistics (adjusted for 3 lags) are reported in parentheses.
37Table VIII: The Lehman Brothers Euro-aggregate industrial corporate bond portfolios
sorted on rating
α βEMKT βTERM βCMF R2 E [R]
−0.0007 −0.0550 0.7849 0.1591 0.1627 −0.0003
(−0.7199) (−3.8647) (0.4435) (0.5781)
−0.0002 −0.0605 0.1914 0.2726 0.1377 −0.0003
(−0.1897) (−4.2683) (0.0889) (0.8825)
−0.0003 −0.0496 0.4817 0.2871 0.0914 −0.0002
(−0.2315) (−3.0092) (0.2214) (1.0274)
−0.0004 −0.0370 1.3619 0.4976 0.0708 −0.0003
(−0.3551) (−2.7172) (0.6662) (1.6431)
0.0015 0.0554 3.1904 1.3851 0.0618 0.0011
(0.5592) ( 1.9091) (0.9239) (1.7404)
This table reports the results of the time-series regressions of the excess realized
returns of ﬁve Lehman Brothers Euro-aggregate industrial corporate bond portfolios
sorted on rating (AAA, AA, A, BAA and High Yield) on the excess market returns
(EMKT), the spread between long and short Euro bonds (TERM) and the CMF
between January 2003 and October 2006, 197 weeks. The CMF is extracted from
returns on defaultable zero-coupon bonds maturing in ﬁve years according to the
model in Equation (27). The ﬁrst line corresponds to the higher-rating portfolio.
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
38Table IX: The Lehman Brothers Euro-aggregate corporate bond portfolios sorted on
maturity
α βEMKT βTERM βCMF adj R2 E [R]
−0.0006 −0.0188 1.0872 0.2645 0.1186 −0.0001
(−1.1988) (−3.4722) (1.1677) (2.1299)
−0.0003 −0.0385 0.8861 0.3908 0.1066 −0.0002
(−0.3513) (−3.4332) (0.5141) (1.6555)
−0.0008 −0.0693 2.1092 0.3910 0.1417 −0.0002
(−0.5271) (−3.6313) (0.8244) (1.0410)
0.0000 −0.0763 0.0900 0.4878 0.1089 −0.0005
(0.0072) (−3.2838) (0.0279) (1.1081)
0.0012 −0.1013 2.6832 1.1192 0.0794 0.0007
(0.3786) (−2.9269) (0.5325) (1.5013)
This table reports the results of the time-series regressions of the excess realized
returns of ﬁve Lehman Brothers Euro-aggregate corporate bond portfolios sorted on
maturity (1–3 years, 3–5 years, 5–7 years, 7–10 years and 10+ years) on the excess
market returns (EMKT), the spread between long and short Euro bonds (TERM) and
the CMF between January 2003 and October 2006, 197 weeks. The CMF is extracted
from returns on defaultable zero-coupon bonds maturing in ﬁve years according to the
model in Equation (27). The ﬁrst line corresponds to the lower-maturity portfolio.
The Newey–West t-statistics (adjusted for 3 lags) are reported in parentheses.
39Table X: The Lehman Brothers Euro-aggregate corporate bond portfolios sorted on
sector
α βEMKT βTERM βCMF R2 E [R]
Cross-Sectional Averages of the Estimates
−0.0004 −0.0416 1.1984 0.4301 0.0703 −0.0002
Cross-Sectional Standard Deviations of the Estimates
0.0004 0.0159 0.8203 0.2036 0.0337 0.0001
Cross-Sectional Averages of the t-Statistics
(−0.3498) (−3.3661) (0.4835) (1.5052)
Cross-Sectional Standard Deviations of the t-Statistics
(0.2960) (1.1992) (0.2949) (0.5092)
This table reports the results of the time-series regressions of the excess realized
returns of 16 Lehman Brothers Euro-aggregate corporate bond portfolios sorted on
sector (Aero/Defense, Banking, Building Materials, Capital Goods, Chemicals, Com-
munications, Consumer Noncyclical, Consumer Cyclical, Diversiﬁed Manufacturing,
Food and Beverages, Lodging, Reﬁning, Telephone, Tobacco, Wireless and Media
Noncable), on the excess market returns (EMKT), the spread between long and
short Euro bonds (TERM) and the CMF between January 2003 and October 2006,
197 weeks. The CMF is extracted from returns on defaultable zero-coupon bonds
maturing in ﬁve years according to the model in Equation (27). Each panel reports
an average statistic across portfolios.
40Table XI: Pooled regressions for corporate bond portfolios
α βEMKT βTERM βCMF adj R2 E [R]
Merrill Lynch sorted on rating
0.0004 −0.0409 1.2526 0.3539 0.0963 0.0003
(0.6173) (−4.4799) (1.1253) (2.1702)
Merrill Lynch sorted on rating/maturity
0.0006 −0.0539 1.1575 0.4014 0.0917 0.0003
(1.5949) (−9.2750) (1.6852) (4.0677)
Merrill Lynch sorted on maturity
0.0005 −0.0391 1.7231 0.4392 0.0535 0.0004
(0.6617) (−3.2384) (1.3380) (2.3995)
Lehman Brothers sorted on rating
−0.0000 −0.0293 1.2021 0.5203 0.0329 −0.0005
(−0.0502) (−3.0176) (1.0575) (2.7349)
Lehman Brothers sorted on maturity
−0.0001 −0.0609 1.3711 0.5306 0.0767 −0.0005
(−0.1112) (−5.3811) (1.0059) (2.7049)
Lehman Brothers sorted on sectors
−0.0004 −0.0416 1.1984 0.4301 0.0706 −0.0007
(−1.1990) (−9.5535) (2.0372) (4.7138)
This table reports the results of the pooled regressions of the excess realized returns of
corporate bond portfolios on the excess market returns (EMKT), the spread between
long and short Euro bonds (TERM) and the CMF between January 2003 and October
2006, 197 weeks. The CMF is extracted from returns on defaultable zero-coupon
bonds maturing in ﬁve years according to the model in Equation (27). The ﬁrst line
corresponds to the lower-maturity portfolio. The Newey–West t-statistics (adjusted
for 3 lags) are reported in parentheses.
41Table XII: Pooled regressions for equity portfolios
α βEMKT βTERM βCMKT βCMF adj R2 E [R]
Finland
−0.0008 0.2686 5.4926 0.2005 −0.5073 0.1643 0.0031
(−0.8230) (11.908) (2.9977) (14.839) (−2.3018) n = 75
France
0.0026 0.0945 −3.6029 0.6705 −0.0862 0.3437 0.0022
(3.9095) (1.9018) (−3.0799) (12.803) (−0.5036) n = 113
Germany
0.0018 0.0799 −1.3920 0.6187 0.0080 0.3352 0.0023
(2.4525) (1.6718) (−1.0053) (16.535) (0.0403) n = 112
Netherlands
0.0023 0.3318 −2.4220 0.3678 0.2469 0.2984 0.0019
(2.6127) (9.1078) (−1.5138) (10.7255) (1.0287) n = 76
Sweden
0.0017 0.0631 −2.6421 0.6434 −0.3013 0.4751 0.0028
(2.2894) (2.3808) (−1.8971) (32.703) (−1.7799) n = 69
UK
0.0021 −0.0095 −1.9132 0.6924 0.2251 0.2987 0.0018
(2.7902) (−0.5649) (−1.4125) (30.818) (1.2429) n = 75
This table reports the results of the pooled regressions of the excess realized returns
of country-speciﬁc equity portfolios sorted on sectors on the excess market returns
(EMKT), the spread between long and short Euro bonds (TERM), the country-
speciﬁc excess market return (CMKT) and the CMF between January 2003 and
October 2006, 197 weeks. The CMF is extracted from returns on defaultable zero-
coupon bonds maturing in ﬁve years according to the model in Equation (27). The
ﬁrst line corresponds to the lower-maturity portfolio. The Newey–West t-statistics
(adjusted for 3 lags) are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Distribution of ﬁrms by median credit rating during the sample period.


















Figure 2: The estimates of the slope coeﬃcient on the CMF extracted from returns on
defaultable zero-coupon bonds with maturity varying from one to ﬁve years. These
slopes are estimated from the time-series regressions of the excess realized returns of
ﬁve Lehman Brothers Euro-aggregate industrial corporate bond portfolios sorted on
rating (AAA, AA, A, BAA and High Yield) on the excess market returns (EMKT),
the Euro term spread (TERM) and the CMF between January 2003 and October
2006, 197 weeks.















Figure 3: The estimates of the slope coeﬃcient on the CMF extracted from returns on
defaultable zero-coupon bonds with maturity varying from one to ﬁve years. These
slope coeﬃcients are estimated from the time-series regressions of the excess realized
returns of ﬁve Lehman Brothers Euro-aggregate corporate bond portfolios sorted on
maturity (1–3 years, 3–5 years, 5–7 years, 7–10 years and 10+ years) on the excess
market returns (EMKT), the Euro term spread (TERM) and the CMF between













Figure 4: The estimates of the slope coeﬃcient on the CMF extracted from returns on
defaultable zero-coupon bonds with maturity varying from one to ﬁve years. These
slopes are estimated from the time-series regressions of the excess realized returns of
three Merrill Lynch nonﬁnancial corporate bond portfolios sorted on rating (AAA,
A and BBB) on the excess market returns (EMKT), the Euro term spread (TERM)
and the CMF between January 2003 and October 2006, 197 weeks.















Figure 5: The estimates of the slope coeﬃcient on the CMF extracted from returns on
defaultable zero-coupon bonds with maturity varying from one to ﬁve years. These
slope coeﬃcients are estimated from the time-series regressions of the excess realized
returns of four Merrill Lynch nonﬁnancial corporate bond portfolios sorted on matu-
rity (1–3 years, 3–5 years, 5–7 years, and 10+ years) on the excess market returns
(EMKT), the Euro term spread (TERM) and the CMF between January 2003 and
October 2006, 197 weeks.



















Figure 6: The estimates of the slope coeﬃcient on the CMF extracted from returns on
defaultable zero-coupon bonds with maturity varying from one to ﬁve years. These
slope coeﬃcients are estimated from the time-series regressions of the excess realized
returns of four A-rated Merrill Lynch corporate bond portfolios sorted on maturity
(1–5 years, 5–7 years, 7–10 years and 10+ years) and three BBB-rated Merrill Lynch
corporate bond portfolios sorted on maturity (1–5 years, 5–7 years, and 7–10 years)
on the excess market returns (EMKT), the Euro term spread TERM and the CMF
between January 2003 and October 2006, 197 weeks.
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